Political violence in the American South: 1882-1890 by Menaster, Kimberly (Kimberly Ann)
Political Violence in the American South: 1882-1890
by
Kimberly Menaster
B.A., Political Science (2008)
University of California: Los Angeles
Submitted to the Department of Political Science in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Political
Science
at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
August 2009
@ 2009 Kimberly Menaster
All Rights Reserved
MASACHUSETTS W-4fTtE
OF TECHNOLOGY
OCT 0 5 2009
LIBRARIES
The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and to
distribute publicly paper and electronic copies of this thesis document
in whole or in part in any medium now known or hereafter created.
Signature of
Author. ....................
Certified
by...................
Department of Political Science
August 7> 2009
..................
James Snyder
Professor of Political Science
Thesis Supervisor
Accepted
by........................ . y .. . . . . . . ..... ................. ...............P e t e r s o n
Roger Peterson
Chair, Graduate Program Committee
ARCHIVES

The racial status quo in the American South persisted through an
unspoken detente between the federal government and the Southern
state governments during the second half of the 19 th century. The
political disenfranchisement of blacks took place in distinct stages
following Reconstruction. In the 1880s, Jim Crowe had not yet been
enacted but Reconstruction was over. Blacks were technically allowed
to vote, but turnout was around five percent at any given election.
The prevailing historical theory is that the threat of violence was a
form of de facto disenfranchisement that prevented blacks from
turning out to vote. Both historians and political scientists assume
lynching to be the method through which the white population of the
American South prevented political and social equality. Lynching is a
form of ethnic violence, but there has not yet been a rigorous
methodological examination of it as a potential form of political
violence.
In the following thesis I will examine the claims regarding the
use of political violence within lynching in the southern United States.
Under what circumstances would political violence be used or not be
used in equilibrium? I begin with the assumption that lynching
increases due to an impending election. Violence would be a function
of the temporal proximity of a certain election. I will examine this
claim using the dates of lynching and elections from 1880 to 1890.
The second analysis of the paper examines whether or not political
violence is due to factional politics. Violence would then be a function
of the margin of the Republican or Democrat victory. The temptation
to engage in political violence to manipulate election outcomes
increases as the election draws closer. In this analysis, we examine
the violence leading up to the election date with controls, including
fixed effects (by state and county), census data and clustered
standard error.
When the United States Constitution was ratified in 1789, free
male blacks could vote in Maine, Tennessee and Vermont. In 1865,
free male blacks could vote in Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
Vermont and Rhode Island. In 1866, only 5% of eligible blacks voted
in former Confederate states. One year of extending the franchise to
blacks and the percent rose to 80.5% (Valelly 2004, pg. 3). The black
vote enraged elements of the white population, substantively
crystallized in movements such as the KKK, which was founded in
1868. During the 5 3 rd Congress (1893-1895), 94% of the voting
rights measures legislated during Reconstruction were repealed
(Valelly 2004, pg. 1). The national rates of lynching fell shortly
afterwards.
Violence in the American South escalated throughout the second
half of the 19 th century. The homicide rate in the South was the
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highest in the United States and among the highest for industrialized
nations (Ayers 1992, pg. 155). From 1882-1931, 4,589 people were
lynched with a peak in the 1890s of 154 victims per year (Horowitz
1983). Historians see lynching as a reassertion of white Supremacy in
light of the abolition of slavery and the carpetbagger occupation of the
South (Horowitz 1983).
Political violence during Reconstruction vastly surpassed the
political violence we note in our decade of interest (1880-1890). After
1877, Republican assassinations and the threat of violence had all but
suppressed opposition to the Democratic Party (Kousser 1999, pg. 22).
Republicans still garnered respectable vote shares throughout the
1880s, though there were drops in their vote share immediately
following violence (Kousser 1999, pg. 23). Violence was as common a
tool as miscounting Republican votes (Vallely 2004, pg. 50). While
Kousser believes that the vote drop-off cannot be solely attributed to
the violence, he does allege a connection between elections and
violence, a claim consistently present in the following literature review.
Political violence was not an effective long term deterrent, repetition
was necessary in order to disenfranchise blacks.
As "redemption" ended and the "restoration" of the South began
(the time periods will be subsequently discussed) lynching decreased.
The national rate of lynching dropped as disenfranchisement became
permanent and legal (Vallely 2004, pg. 144). Again, regardless of the
effectiveness of political violence or the direct correlation to turnout,
lynching persisted throughout the 1880s. Lynching peaked in the
1890s, while Jim Crowe and other legal "reforms" were being
instituted, only to fall by 1900 and decrease each decade after (noted
in both our dataset and the historical literature).
Blacks are being excluded from voting through intimidation. If
violence increases before a federal election, the powers that be are
attempting to prevent an influx of blacks voting for the Republican
Party or third party movements, such as Populism or Greenbacks. In
the brief period where adult male blacks had the right to vote, there
was evidence that the social and political structure of the South would
be irrevocably altered, as over 80% of the eligible black voting
population voted, even electing black representatives to Congress.
The Reconstruction configuration of elites allowed the
disfranchisement of a large (in some areas, a majority) group. The
disenfranchisement process created high voting penalties. The
Australian ballot and other double edged election reforms lowered the
cost of voting "incorrectly" by privileging one's vote; at the same time,
the cost of voting increases as political violence is strategically
implemented to prevent blacks from going to the polls.
Any lynching causal mechanism returns to this historical claim of
lynching increasing before elections. Whether the impetuses for
violence are an attempt to prevent wealth redistribution or reduce
Republican turnout, both allege violence to be politically motivated
prior to elections.
Data:
The data is from several sources: an Inter-university Consortium
for Political and Social Research dataset entitled "Candidate Name and
Constituency Totals", a "lynching inventory" created by Professors
Stewart Tolnay and E.M. Beck, and historical U.S. census data from
1880 and 1890. I will discuss all, though organization and
assumptions will be reserved for the latter half of the paper.
Professors Tolnay and Beck provided the "lynching inventory" for
this thesis. The perennial index of Southern lynching is from the
NAACP "Thirty Years of Lynching in the United States, 1889-1918." A
Tuskegee inventory also exists and was published by Daniel Williams in
"Amid the Gathering Multitude: The Story of Lynching in America. A
Classified Listing." Finally, the Chicago Tribune published lists of lynch
victims from 1882-1918. Professors Tolnay and Beck note that each of
these sources is potentially flawed (1995, pg. 259). They combined all
three sources and crosschecked each incidence of violence with local
newspaper stories.
The final inventory spans 1882-1930 and includes Alabama,
Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North
Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee. These states are considered
by the ICPSR to be part of the South or the Deep South (their state
codes range from 40 to 56). Of states defined to be in the South, we
are missing Texas and Virginia. The inventory also includes the
county, gender, race, and reason for violence.
"Candidate Name and Constituency Totals" is part of several
ICPSR datasets containing election data from 1788 to 1900 in the
United States. This particular dataset contains the month of the
election, notably missing from other datasets. From the election data,
we preserve the Democratic and Republican vote shares, as well as
total vote share. This allows us to create a variable that notes the
margin of victory, as an indicator of a close election, regardless of
which political party won.
The ICPSR dataset is, most importantly, missing the months in
which twenty eight governor elections and one congressional election
occur. This missing data was filled in with information from the New
York Times archives.
The U.S. Census Bureau maintains historical records from each
census conducted. As our lynching data begins in 1882 and the period
of interest are from the end of Reconstruction, 1877, to the beginning
of legal disenfranchisement, 1890, we will use census data from 1880
and 1890. The census data is not intended as an independent variable,
but rather as controls on regressions we run. The census data of
interest is therefore, measures of black and urban populations, as well
as a poverty measure. For the years between the 1880 and the 1890
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census, a linear imputation is assumed to fill in the missing values.
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Why 1880-1890?
Reconstruction ended with the Compromise of 1877. The South
agreed Hayes to allow him to accede to the Presidency without enough
electoral votes (he was missing one vote). In return, the federal
government withdrew troops from South Carolina and Tennessee and
agreed to end its rebuilding efforts (Hanks 1987).
The exact period of disenfranchisement does not hold such a
clear historical consensus. The debate between Key, Woodward, and
Kousser regarding the process of disenfranchisment is predicated on
the belief that from 1877 to the formal institution of Jim Crowe by
1908 is a continuous period of voter elimination (Key 1949, Woodward
1974, and Kousser 1974).
However, historians in the early 2 0 th century alleged two distinct
periods, "Redemption" from the mid 1870s to mid 1890s and
"Restoration" from 1890-1908 (Perman 2001). During "Redemption",
violence, force, legislation and poll fraud were all utilized to eliminate
the effectiveness of the black vote.
Congress introduces the Australian ballot in federal law in 1890,
so we will attempt to capture the period before the start of legal
disenfranchisement. Otherwise, we would be looking at both "de
facto" and "de jure" disenfrachisment which could have different
relationships between voting deterrence and lynching.
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Our lynching data begins in 1882, so our dataset will span 1882
to 1890. Ideally, the lynching data would begin in 1877, after the
compromise, but information does not exist from those years.
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Lynching in the American South: Perspective and Definitions
Lynching was a form of frontier justice where mobs murdered
both whites and blacks in regions where the legal system was judged
insufficient. This legal element of legitimacy was important for
sustaining the practice of lynching. The lynch mobs could be, in part,
described as a community defense against the violence that the
Southern law enforcement could not neither prevent nor control.
The NAACP defines lynching in four points
"1...evidence that a person was killed; 2. The
person must have met death illegally; 3. A group of three
or more persons must have participating in the killing and
4. The group must have acted under the pretext of service
to justice or tradition." (Tolnay and Beck 1995, pg. 260)
Note that lynching, as put forth by the NAACP, does not necessarily
contain a racial motivation. Lynch mobs were both black and white in
our time period of interest (though black lynch mobs generally lynched
only black victims and were uncommon). However, as we are
interested in ethnic violence used as a voting disincentive, we will add
Brubaker and Laitin's definition of ethnic violence to restrict our
analysis to white mobs lynching black victims:
"Violence perpetrated across ethnic lines, in which at
least one party is not a state (or a representative of a
state), and in which the putative ethnic difference is coded
as having been integral rather than incidental to the
violence." (Brubaker and Laitin 1998)
Crosstab of victim/mob ethnicity (1882-1890)
Victim
Mob White Black Total
Black 3 43 46
White 93 349 442
Total 96 392 488
(For all ten states in dataset)
The black lynch mob victim was typically accused of a crime
versus a member of the white community. The crime could be as
seemingly trivial as insulting a white woman. However, as
aforementioned, the role of lynching as a proxy for a functional
criminal justice system in response to serious crimes such as rape or
murder. Lynching was a "legal" reaction without due process. There
were no trials to confirm the crimes of which a person was accused.
Black plantation labor was the livelihood of many counties;
lynching could precipitate black flight that would deprive a region of its
traditional labor (Horowitz 1983). Consequently, lynching was more
common in communities where the black population density was low
and people could not easily relocate; this assertion is proven in my
dataset in the negative coefficient on "percent black". Areas with low
black population density also lacked a fear of black retribution against
lynch mobs; there were not enough people to organize into a credible
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defensive threat. The highest lynching rates are along the gulf plain,
from Florida to Texas, and the cotton uplands of Mississippi, Louisiana,
Arkansas and Texas (Ayers 1992, pg. 157). Again, these regions are
characterized by their rural nature, low population density and most
significantly, an increase in the black population after the Civil War.
Political Parties after Reconstruction
The Republican Party believed the only way to be electorally
competitive in the South was to form a electoral alliance between elite
urban whites and former slaves. Former plantation owners were firmly
aligned with the Democratic party due to their resentment at the
Northern intrustion during Reconstruction, especially as the federal
government (under a Republican administration and Republican
majority Congress) disenfranchised former Confederate officers. The
Republican Party base would include former slaves, union supporters
and relocated Northerners (Ayers 1992). Such support ensured that
the Republican Party in the South was not going to survive past
Reconstruction occupation of the South. Relocated Northerners, or
"carpetbaggers", would return to the North after Reconstruction.
Former slaves would be unable to vote without the federal
government's presence. Union supporters were clustered in the
Border States and are therefore unable to provide the Republican Party
with a majority during elections. The Republican Party further
alienated potential voters when former Confederates were
disenfranchised during Reconstruction(Abbott 1986).
When it became clear that there was no electoral potential for
the Republican Party in the South beyond Reconstruction, the national
party organization withdrew any significant presence in 1868 (Abbott
1986). This transformed the South into a one-party region. The
process of the Democratic Party retaking state governments was called
"redeeming" (Ayers 1992).
In each state from its point of redemption onward, the
Democratic Party functioned as a party machine, dictated by loyalty
and patronage (Ayer 1992, Key 1949). The Democrats held yearly
nominating conventions in August where they nominated a
predetermined person for each position (Ayer 1992). The existence of
a one-party system in the South meant that the Democratic Party was
a shell for factional politics. Distinctive voter cleavages and groupings
arose among voters in the century after the civil war and different
states adopted different leadership mechanisms for their political
machines (Key 1949).
Anti-minority polarization was a strategy to ensure regional one-
party domination. The politicians would split ethnic and religious
minority groups, blacks in the South, Irish and Catholics in the North,
to prevent them from forming a voting coalition. Multi-racial/ethnic
political challenges were prevented by politics as usual (pg. 232,
Wilkinson 2004). These efforts are noted in an increase in political
violence around elections. In Louisiana, lynching increases election
years in the 1890s, with the largest increase during the contested
1896 governor's race (Inverarity 1976).
Predominantly black districts were drawn through
gerrymandering during Reconstruction. These districts elected black
Republican representatives through 1880 (Ayers 1992). Meanwhile,
the Republican Party recovered from staggering losses in the South in
the presidential elections of 1872 and 1876 to maintain a respectable,
if not a majority, vote share - mostly due to the efforts of local, not
national, Republican party organizations. The Republican Party
platform championed the common white man and attempted to appeal
non-elite whites by adopting bread-and-butter issues (Ayers 1992).
The Democrats in the South wanted white voters to identify with
the party based on race and not on party platform or issues. If poor
whites were voting in their best interest, they would identify with the
Republican Party. The Democrats capitalized on the resentment of
poor whites towards the Republican Party regarding the civil war and
Reconstruction. The elite tactic is to polarize the ethnic majority, in
this case, whites, with an anti-minority identity (Wilkinson 2004, pg.
4). Substantive issues did not identify parties. Whites would vote
Democrat and blacks would vote Republican.
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The Process of Disenfranchisement:
The campaign to disenfranchise voters in the South was a
"bourbon coup d'etat" by the Democratic party (Key 1949). As the
South had become a predominantly one party system at the end of
reconstruction, the elements that advocated disenfranchisement were
present in the leadership of the Democratic Party. Democrats in power
were in perpetual fear of the black vote's potential to oust them (Key
1949).
The supporters of the state campaigns for disenfranchisement
were the black belt elements of the Southern Democratic Party
(Woodward 1951). There was an ongoing class conflict between white
southerners from the black belt (the Deep South) and from the hill
country (the Border States). The black vote was pivotal in the class
conflict between whites and there was an effort to remove your
opponents' potential electoral advantage.
Woodward's seminal work on the South, "The Strange Career of
Jim Crow" noted that amidst this conflict was an effort to distinguish
ethnic lines (1951). Blacks were the scapegoat used to unify the white
population within the Republican Party. The Democratic Party would
mobilize black votes for electoral support in competitive election
environment, as noted by the election of Senate Edmund Pettus (D-
Alabama) by a coalition between the Democratic Party and blacks.
J. Morgan Kousser refutes Woodward and Key in "The Shaping of
Southern Politics" (1974). He agrees with Woodward and Key that the
movement for disenfranchisement originated in the Democratic Party.
However, Kousser believes that the Conservative Democrats in the
Black Belt were responsible. Elite Democrats were attempting to
reduce the impact of the poor white vote. Disenfranchising blacks
prevented any use of that electoral support base to upset the status
quo or redistribute wealth.
There is a distinction made by both Key and Woodward of "de
facto" and "de jure" voting restriction. Legal means were used to
restrict the black vote before the formal implementation of Jim Crowe.
The existence of these means proves that voting restriction during the
1880s and 1890s was not "de jure". Perman, Key and Woodward and
Kousser all directly or indirectly reference the temporary
disenfranchisement achieved through violence and intimidation.
Disenfranchisement was temporary during this time period; Jim Crowe
made it permanent (Perman 2001). Perman agrees with V.O. Key that
the process was a "bourbon coup d'etat", a series of movements by
factions within the Democracy party rather than a concerted effort by
the party rank-and-file.
Election reform was a cover for the initial disenfranchisement of
black voters. The Australian ballot was originally intended to control
factions within each political party by privileging an individual's vote.
Rather than telling the county registrar your vote, which they would
record, an individual received their own ballot to read and mark at the
polls. The ballot allowed for an "educational" requirement; voters had
to be able to read to properly mark their ballot (Ayers 1992, Fredman
1968). Along with the reading requirement, an "understanding"
clause, purposely vague, was introduced to "protect the ballot of poor
white men," as noted by South Carolina's governor Benjamin Tillman
in 1895 (Ayers 1992, pg. 289).
Disenfranchisement maintained the racial status quo and would
eventually include a residence restriction, a poll tax and a stacked
board of registrars. In 1898, the Supreme Court condoned the
practice of disenfranchisement in Williams v. Mississippi, stating that
the poll tax and literacy requirement did not violate the fifteenth
amendment (Ayers 1992, pg. 290).
The potential for violence during a campaign:
Election violence, in this thesis, adheres the following definition:
"acts of threats of coercion, intimidation or physical
harm perpetrated to affect an electoral process or that
arises in the context of electoral competition. When
perpetrated to affect an electoral process, violence may be
employed to influence the process of elections...and to
influence the outcomes." (Sisk 2008).
New regimes are vulnerable to violence and provocation from
factions within their political parties (Sisk 2008, Snyder and Mansfield
1995). Nationalist groups often identify ethnic groups within the state
as existing outside their nationalist doctrine and are therefore
"enemies of the nation" (Snyder and Mansfield 1995). Consequently,
factions coalesce within political parties during elections. These
factions are integral to the eventual disenfranchisement of black
voters, as noted in the aforementioned debate between Key,
Woodward and Perman regarding the disenfranchisement process.
Research on other countries suggests that elite organizations
that promote ethnic violence consist of a group hierarchy with the
majority of the membership being poor (pg. 434, Brubaker and Laitin
1998). Elites simultaneously maintain the social hierarchy while
manipulating their group members to accept the status quo. The poor
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membership is acting against its own best interest.
The election process is tainted with threats and intimidation to
prevent registration, turnout and participation. Vulnerable elites will
instigate and provoke violence in order to prevent challenges to their
power from other elites (pg. 433, Brubaker and Laitin 1998). In two
party systems threatened by unrest, one party controls the source of
that unrest as a political base (Ellman and Wantchekon 2000). The
coercion of the elements of political unrest, combined with private
knowledge, gives us uncertain elections. Voters are poorly informed
about both the costs of voting and the preferences of other voters
(Palfrey and Rosenthal 1985). Election monitoring raised the cost of
voting and resulted in selective disenfranchisement (Key 1949,
Kousser 1974, Palfrey and Rosenthal 1985).
Political violence is more likely to occur when one party keeps
the probability of that political violence occurring private (Ellman and
Wantchekon 2000, Longregan and Vindigni 2006). The uncertainty
present around elections induces a population to vote against its own
interests by voting for what they hope is regional stability over
uncertainty and the potential collapse of the peace (Wantchekon
1999). In El Salvador (among others), the dominant party wins
elections because voters fear the repercussions of the party without
control of the violent elements winning. The lack of public knowledge
can cause more than undemocratic elections; there is the possibility of
violence given escalation during the campaign process (Longregan and
Vindigni 2006).
The "evolution of cooperation" (Axelrod 1984) was such that
blacks knew that they could minimize racial violence and violent costs
by acquiescing to the white demands (i.e. not voting). While there
was low information concerning the specific conditions under which
violence spontaneously occured, the provocation for organized violence
was well known.
Two party competitions at the federal level can, but do not
necessarily, result in strong government intervention on behalf of the
minority. Free institutions are not impossible in multi-ethnic states,
contrary to the beliefs of Thomas Jefferson and John Mills. However,
this intervention will only occur if the current government needs
minority votes for future election prospects (pg. 206, Wilkinson 2004).
Otherwise, the government will enact a biased or weak response. The
federal government did intervene in South Carolina and Louisiana but
withdrew as part of political negotiating that surrounded Hayes' 1877
election (pg. 234, Wilkinson 2004). The Republicans did not need the
South's electoral votes to win the presidency and subsequently, had no
interest in assuring blacks could vote.
Data organization:
County-specific observations of months/years
year
month 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 Total
January 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 57150
February 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 57150
March 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 57150
April 6350 6350 6351 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 57151
May 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 57150
June 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 57150
July 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 57150
August 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 57150
September 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 57150
October 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 57150
November 6503 6350 6688 6350 6503 6350 6688 6352 6503 58287
December 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350 57150
Total 76353 76200 76539 76200 76353 76200 76538 76202 76353 686938
State-specific observations of months/years
year
month 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 Total
January 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 90
Februry 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 90
March 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 90
April 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 90
May 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 90
June 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 90
July 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 90
August 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 90
September 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 90
October 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 90
November 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 90
December 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 90
Total 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 1080
For our preliminary analysis of a correlation between elections
and lynching events, a "condensed" dataset will be used as we start
our analysis at the state level. This is state, not county, level data for
each month from 1882 to 1890. The number of observations reflects
the organization of the data set. There are twelve months in each
year and nine years in our dataset. Each state will have 108
observations (12*9) and our ten state dataset will yield 1080
observations. As elections are indicator variables within each
observation, additional observations in particular months are not
possible in the state specific dataset. This loses a degree of detail
regarding each election, which we will regain when using the larger
dataset.
Our complete dataset is organized in a very straightforward
manner. For each county in the South, there is an observation for
each month from 1882-1890. There are 6350 counties in our dataset,
which explains the observation count in individual cells in the chart
"observations (cross-tab) of months/years." Many of these
observations have null values for lynching events and elections, as
both are infrequent occurrences. However, this allows us to compare
all possible treatments.
The larger dataset examines potential causal mechanisms for
lynching, as presented in the literature review, by maintaining detailed
margin, political party and turnout information for each election
observation. It also has the inputted census values, which we will use
as controls. Otherwise, it is the same organizational structure as our
smaller dataset.
The chart "Observations (cross-tab) of months/years" does not
have 6,350 observations in each box as each election type gets its own
observation. November observations increase due to the multiple
types of elections held in that month. If there were no duplicates, the
total count in the dataset would be 685,800, but there are 1,138
"duplicate" observations, gives us a total of 686,938.
Cross tab of election months
Election
Month No Yes Total
January 57150 0 57150
February 57150 0 57150
March 57150 0 57150
April 57079 72 57151
May 57150 0 57150
June 57150 0 57150
July 57150 0 57150
August 56555 595 57150
September 56765 385 57150
October 56498 652 57150
November 52337 5950 58287
December 57150 0 57150
Total 679284 7654 686938
Any election in the above cross-tab that does not take place in
November is a gubernatorial election. While special elections were
occasionally, federal elections were in November, regardless of
whether or not it was an off-year election.
Of the 5,950 county election observations in November, 3,628
are Congressional, 1,362 are Gubernatorial and 960 are Presidential.
There are 7,654 total election observations; consequently 1,704
gubernatorial elections take place outside November.
Election type by month
Election type
month President Governor Congress Total
January 0 0 0 0
February 0 0 0 0
March 0 0 0 0
April 0 72 0 72
May 0 0 0 0
June 0 0 0 0
July 0 0 0 0
August 0 595 0 595
September 0 385 0 385
October 0 652 0 652
November 960 1362 3628 5950
December 0 0 0 0
Missing 0 0 0 0
Total 960 3066 3628 7654
Elections by type
Office Frequency (total) Frequency (Nov)
President 960 960
Governor 3066 1362
Congress 3628 3628
Total 7654 5950
Margin of victory:
The margin of victory is regardless of whether Republicans or
Democrats won; we are interested in the "closeness" of the election.
The margin is expressed as a voteshare of the majority party over the
top two highest election voteshares.
The margin of victory used in the regression tables in the text of
the thesis is 40-60, as the more "relaxed" definition includes more
elections. However, coding the margin at 45-55 does not change the
results and the regressions are included in the appendix.
Census data:
The census data allowed the creation of various economic and
regional controls. Tolnay and Beck included two black population
measures as controls, the log of the black population and the percent
of the total population that is black (1995), when conducting their
analysis. We will use these same controls in our regressions.
We will generate two measures of socioeconomic status of the
region: the percent of sharecroppers with less than 10 acres and the
percent of total farms that are sharecropping. This will hopefully
isolate poverty and deprivation, both of which can contribute to
violence.
Finally, we include the percent of the population that lives in an
urban area within that county. The construct of the urban population
yields many counties with 0%, as they are entirely rural.
Our dependent variable integrates the census data. I construct
a measure of black lynching events per 100,000 black people, in order
to control for different county and population sizes in our regression.
A county of 1,000 people that has five lynching events is significantly
more violence than a county of 100,000 people that has five lynching
events. As we do not have population data for all of our counties, this
construction drops out some of our counties in the regressions.
The only census controls with an effect on black lynching events
are the black population measures, as noted in the following table,
which uses state fixed effects.
Census controls (with county fixed effects)
COEFFICIENT Lynching per 100,000 blacks
Log of population 0.0314
(0.049)
Percent black -11.49**
(5.086)
Percent black squared 27.34**
(11.890)
Percent black cubed -19.29**
(8.168)
(Sharecropfarms<10 acres)/Total farms -3.153
(3.379)
Sharecrop farms/Total farms 0.502
(0.572)
Urban population/Total population -0.507
(0.344)
Constant 0.867
(0.598)
Observations 547649
R-squared 0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses (state and year)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
With county fixed effects
While the ICPSR and lynch data have county id numbers, the
egen command is used in Stata to generate a group id that consists of
both state and county. The census data, as well as the margin of
victory, are county-specific information and should be treated as such.
Fixing the regression "census controls (with county fixed
effects)" by county, means that the above results indicate change in
one of our census demographic variables within a county. The robust
standard error correctly assumes that errors are correlated within the
state and year of observation.
The only variable significant in the "census controls" regression
is the proportion of a population that is black. As the black population
in a county increases, keeping in mind both the state and year are
adjusted for correlated standard error, lynching events per 100,000
blacks decrease by a substantive amount. The significance of both the
squared and cubed values of perccent black indicates that when there
is a substantive but not overwhelming population of blacks, violence
increases. Minority and majority black districts experience less
violence. It is likely, though we cannot assert causation, that blacks
are migrating to safer regions of the South purposively and their
presence makes the region even safer. This conflicts with the
historical perspective that regions with black population growth are
more likely to experience lynching violence, though this appears to be
anecdotally based (Ayers 1992). Additionally, we can create a
narrative where violence is a crime of opportunity - committed where
it will influence election outcomes but not risk retaliation.
Why does our 'n' drop in regression output?
In our state level analysis, there are no controls imposed on the
regressions. The analysis includes 1,080 observations in each
regression, as is expected.
However, the county-level analysis observations are not
consistently 686,938 as suggested by the table "Observations (cross-
tabs) of months/years". This is due to missing census data that we
include as regression controls. The census data does not exist for all
Southern counties in 1880 and 1890. Also, some counties are missing
certain pieces of census information; the missing information is not
consistently missing by counties. 148,323 observations (by county)
do not have information on the black population while 149,249
observations (by county) do not have information on the total
population. Each of these missing values amounts to about 20% of
our total observations.
N' Problem in Regressions
Variable Observations
Percent black 551498
Percent black squared 551498
Percent black cubed 551498
Log of total population 552219
To demonstrate that the missing census controls do not
adversely affect our results, the first column of each regression table
will be without census controls, which gives us our expected 'n' of
686,938.
State level analysis of electoral timing:
Electoral timing (at the state level)
(1)
Black lynch (count)VARIABLES
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
Presidential election
Gubernatorial election
Congressional election
Constant
-0.0556
(0.0755)
0.100
(0.107)
0.0333
(0.100)
0.0556
(0.0835)
0.167
(0.106)
0.200**
(0.0920)
0.178
(0.112)
0.229*
(0.118)
0.146
(0.108)
0.00467
(0.107)
0.367**
(0.151)
-0.171
(0.195)
0.280
(0.245)
0.269
(0.169)
0.233***
(0.0656)
Observations
R-squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
State and month fixed effects
1080
0.093
Do elections correspond with lynching? Our preliminary analysis
looks at the month of a lynching event and the month of an election to
see if the two events are correlated.
Within the smaller, state dataset is an OLS regression that uses
state and month fixed effects and a standard error clustered by the
state and year. The results show no significant correlation between an
election and black lynching events. The state level of analysis is
inadequate to reveal any relationships.
While the results are null with regards to elections, the month
fixed effects yield results that are consistent with prior literature on
the subject. It would appear that July, September and December are
correlated with an increase in black lynching events. As our
dependent variable is an integer value (and a count variable), the
coefficients are not enormous, but literally amount to a fifth or a third
of one lynching event.
The source of our lynching inventory, Tolnay and Beck, note this
effect in their book (1995). The authors offer no explanation for it
beyond the observation that the South is hot and humid in the
summer.
The increase of lynching in the summer, regardless of election
occurrence, agrees with criminology literature regarding crime
increases in the summer months. The "heat hypothesis" is that hot
temperatures increase aggressive motives, which can lead to violent
behavior (Anderson 2001). The "heat hypothesis" disputes the
supposed "culture of violence" in the South (Nisbett 1993). Studies
done on crime rates across the United States shows that when
controlling for city size, population size, and economic variables,
higher temperatures precipitate more violence, regardless of location
(Anderson et al., 2000).
The increase of lynching events in December is anecdotally noted
in a political cartoon from the Crisis, a black newspaper published in
the South, entitled "Christmas in Georgia" (Tolnay and Beck 1995).
The cartoon depicts a lynching in Christmas of 1916. Upswings in
violence during the holidays are common, most likely due to large
gatherings of people (Nisbett 1993). The most violent lynching event
in our dataset, eight blacks lynched by a white mob, occurred in
December 1889.
County level analysis of electoral timing:
Electoral timing (at the county level)
(1)
VARIABLES Black lynch (count)
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
Presidential election
Gubernatorial election
Congressional election
Constant
Observations
R-squared
-8.75e-05
(0.000118)
0.000157
(0.000168)
5.25e-05
(0.000157)
8.75e-05
(0.000131)
0.000262
(0.000166)
0.000315**
(0.000144)
0.000316*
(0.000172)
0.000386**
(0.000182)
0.000246
(0.000171)
6.17e-05
(0.000122)
0.000577**
(0.000236)
-0.00255*
(0.00129)
-0.000117
(0.00141)
0.00181
(0.00135)
0.000372***
(0.000103)
686938
0.016
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
County and month fixed effects
In the above regression, presented for a comparison between
the state and county levels of analysis, it would appear that elections
are negatively correlated with black lynching events. The presence of
a presidential election decreases our event count of black lynching.
The coefficient is very small, but regardless, it is significant.
Consequently, the county level, will be the level used for analysis. The
county level has enough observations to draw out the relationships
between holding an election and not holding an election.
Additionally, the same patterns by month are apparent in the
regression. Both summer and December are more dangerous time
periods, as they are correlated with increases in lynching. The
consistent pattern also validates our choice of county level dataset and
assures that no flaws have been made across the data processing.
Nominating convention to the first Tuesday in November:
Longregan and Vindigni (2006) noted that the campaign period
has a strong potential to escalate to violence. There are three
potential treatments in our data, keeping in mind Longregan and
Vindigni's claim, no election, an election and a close election. These
treatments are then relevant from the nominating conventions to the
date of the election.
The New York Times archives consistently notes, as do scholars
of the period (Ayer 1992 and Key 1949) that the Democratic and
Republican nominating conventions occurred in August of election
years. As the vast majority of election observations in our dataset are
on the first Tuesday of November (5950/7654), the campaign period
spans August, September and October. Consequently, dummy
variables are generated to indicate this period as well as whether an
election occurred within this time span. We cannot use the August
through October election period for all gubernatorial elections; there is
more variation on their occurrence in the calendar year (rather than
the cut and dry November date of elections for federal office), as noted
in the previous tables.
The state analysis of whether or not lynching is connected to
elections noted increases in lynching during the late summer months,
perhaps attributable to the "heat hypothesis". However, if that period
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were significant due to impending elections, we would potentially
discount the "heat hypothesis" and establish a causal pattern between
impending elections and black lynching events.
Campaign period with controls
(1) (2)
COEFFICIENT Lvnching per 100.000 blacks
Three months prior election
August-October
Percent black
(Percent black)^2
(Percent black)A3
Log of population
Constant
Observations
R-squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
County and month fixed effects
0.250*** 0.254***
(0.0564) (0.0564)
-0.0075 -0.00779
(0.0206) (0.0206)
-5.400***
(0.7130)
12.81***
(2.1480)
-9.014***
(1.7880)
0.0213
(0.0266)
0.378 0.0366***
(0.2370) (0.0102)
551849 551849
0.01 0.01
The regression table "Campaign period with controls" notes the
influence of the election period on black lynching events per 100,000
blacks. It contains both month and county/state fixed effects. The
first column includes census control, which reduces our number of
observations by about twenty percent. To prove that the relationship
in the data exists regardless of census controls altering our sample,
column two keeps the same observations as column one in order to
run the regression without controls.
The occurrence of an election from August to November is
enough to increase lynching events by one quarter per 100,000 blacks
and is both significant and robust across regressions. The indicator for
the time period of August-November is not significant on its own.
The election period, now that we've appropriate established its'
significance, will be included as a restriction when attempting to
determine the impact of independent variables during a campaign
season as opposed to the alternative treatment "no election."
Additionally, the significant of the election period and not the indicator
for August through October implies that the heat hypothesis may be
discounted in favor of our election period explanation for violence.
Within election periods:
The state level analysis shows that the occurrence of an election
alone, when looking at the state level of analysis, is not enough to
affect violence at the aggregated, state level. The occurrence of a
presidential election decreases lynching at the county level by a
fraction of one event count.
As per our discussion of factional politics in the South, certain
electoral conditions are more permissive of violence than others.
Consequently, I created indicators of close and lopsided elections by
election type. Close is measured at the appropriate level: the state
election returns are used for the governor and presidential election and
the Congressional district is used for Congressional elections. Most
importantly, the close and lopsided election indicators start in August
until the November election. This correctly assumes that the region is
aware of an impending tight race and violence would consequently be
affected in the time leading up to the election.
As a consequence of processing the data, we only capture
elections between the Republican and Democratic Party. The data has
different labels for third party competitors in different years. However,
as we are attempting to attribute an electoral competition between the
two major parties, looking at Democrat and Republican races alone
does not lose a significant degree of the analysis. The data was
initially coded as the top two vote shares, to which I added indicators
to note to which political party the vote share belonged. Of the 7,654
elections for which we have election returns, 2,284 have a victor that
is neither a Republican nor a Democrat. 3,171 have a "runner-up"
that is neither a Republican nor a Democrat. Future work should
attempt to examine all competing political parties.
If, for example, the local majority possessed more than 60% of
the vote share in the election, it would be possible for them to
intimidate a large proportion of the local minority (whose vote would
not decided the election regardless of turnout). The effect of the
intimidation would be to semi-permanently eliminate large numbers of
voters and decrease violence until intimidation needed again due to a
change in the electoral environment. Meanwhile, a 50-50 county may
not engage in violence because both sides of the electoral dispute
have equal resources available. The violence would not be
strategically worthwhile as escalation could theoretically be boundless.
In our regressions, I will include black population information
because there would need to be enough potential black voters in order
to necessitate violence to decrease turnout. However, as noted by the
formation of black militias in South Carolina, there cannot be a
majority black population capable of retaliation. The census data
regression reinforces this belief with the sign of the coefficients on
percent black and its squared and cubed terms. In election years,
violence is targeted to areas that are substantially but not
overwhelmingly black.
At 40-60: Close elections, lopsided elections and lynching per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lynching per
100,000
VARIABLES blacks
Close Congressional election (<60%)
Close Gubernatorial election (<60%)
Close Presidential election (<60%)
Lopsided Congressional election
(>60%)
Lopsided Gubernatorial election
(>60%)
Lopsided Presidential election (>60%)
0.683
(0.776)
-0.243
(0.154)
0.119
(0.154)
0.0116
(0.0934)
-0.0941
(0.0748)
-0.221***
(0.0699)
Percent black
(Percent black)A^2
(Percent black)A^3
Log of population
Constant
Observations
R-squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses
(state and year)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
County and month fixed effects
0.0161
(0.0114)
686938
0.010
0.864
(0.976)
-0.277
(0.171)
0.125
(0.160)
"Limited
sample"
0.859
(0.975)
-0.277
(0.172)
0.125
(0.159)
"Limited
sample"
0.864
(0.976)
-0.277
(0.171)
0.125
(0.160)
0.00486 0.0128 0.00486
(0.108) (0.108) (0.108)
-0.114
(0.0862)
-0.239***
(0.0756)
-5.425**
(2.730)
12.84*
(7.176)
-9.029*
(5.308)
0.0221
(0.0262)
0.359**
(0.138)
-0.111 -0.114
(0.0865) (0.0862)
-0.232*** -0.239***
(0.0744) (0.0756)
-5.425**
(2.730)
12.84*
(7.176)
-9.029*
(5.308)
0.0221
(0.0262)
0.0199 0.359**
(0.0143) (0.138)
551849 551849 551849
0.010 0.010 0.010
In the above regression "At 40-60: Close elections, lopsided
elections and lynching per capita" we have county and month fixed
effects as well as a standard error clustered by the state and year.
The black population and total population measures are included as
controls, as demonstrated by their aforementioned significance in
"Census controls (with county fixed effects)". This analysis compares
the occurrence of certain election conditions to our entire set of
observations.
The first column examines our entire dataset - to do so, it does
not use the census controls. The first column in our regression has a
'N' that adheres to the cross tabs that present the total observation
count in our dataset. The second column uses census controls, which
drops down the sample size by twenty percent. In order to show, as
in the "Campaign period with controls" regression, that the census
controls are not affecting the regression, the third column keeps the
observations from the second column but runs the regression without
controls. The four column adds the census controls back into the
limited observation regression, and therefore, presents the same
results as column two in order to demonstrate that the limited sample
we use is the correct sample of counties without missing census data.
Note that while the election information is measured at the
relevant level, the lynching events are measured at the county level
and scaled by the county-specific population of blacks. It is not
unusual to imagine that state election outcomes are affecting local
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events, especially since Tolnay and Beck (1995) and our research
established counties as the appropriate unit of analysis.
The treatment in this regresson table, as we have indicators for
all potential election outcomes, is any election. The null treatment is
no election.
Lopsided presidential elections decrease the number of lynching
events by about a quarter and are significant in all regressions
presented. Again, this compares to no election. Lopsided presidential
elections imply that violence is not a necessary voting deterrant
because the outcome is assured.
40-60: Within election period: Effect of close November elections
(1) (2)
COEFFICIENT Average lynching (Aug-Oct)
Close Congressional election (<60%) 0.000315 0.000798
(0.00152) (0.00185)
Close Gubernatorial election (<60%) 0.00218* 0.00268*
(0.00121) (0.00159)
Close Presidential election (<60%) 0.00235* 0.00259
(0.00140) (0.00170)
Percent black -0.0164
(0.03540)
(Percent black)A2 0.056
(0.12400)
(Percent black)A3 -0.0544
(0.11300)
Log of population -0.000687
(0.00113)
Constant 0.00285*** 0.011
(0.00062) (0.01060)
Observations 5950 5073
R-squared 0.193 0.203
Robust standard errors in parentheses (state and year)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
County and month fixed effects
The above table "40-60: Within elections period: Effect of close
November elections" examines the effect of close elections on the
average number of lynching events in our election period from August
through October. The regression includes county and month fixed
effects and the standard error is clustered by both state and year. The
'N' in the first column matches with our total November election 'N'
presented in the cross-tabs.
The election period, when previously examined with our
"campaign period with controls" in this thesis, was significant and
robust with a coefficient of 0.25. Consequently, this analysis focuses
on the influence of the electoral environment within the election
period, which is not significant on it's own as an independent variable
in any regressions we've run thus far.
The number of observations decreases to the 5,950 elections
that occur in November across our dataset. We would expect the
period leading up to a highly contested, close election to experience
more violence as a form of voting deterrence. Consequently, lynching
would increase from August, the nominating convention, to the
election in November. We represent this hypothetical period of
violence by averaging lynching from August (the nominating
convention) to October (as the election occurs on the first Tuesday of
November). This analysis ignores the gubernatorial elections that do
not take place in November as I do not have data on their nominating
conventions and consequently, cannot clearly defined the campaign
period.
An impending close election increases violence by a fractional
amount for both gubernatorial and presidential elections. Gubernatorial
elections have significant results that are robust across election
controls. Close presidential elections are not significant once we add
in the census controls. Note that the lynch violence is measured as an
average count from August to November. Our coefficients go to three
decimal places, which shows the effect does not have a practical effect
on lynching outcomes (as it is a count variable).
Issues for further study:
There are three primary improvements that can be made upon
the existing analysis:
The original lynch data is day, month and year specific. The only
reason that the analysis was not conducted by day was that electronic
election information that included the date of the election was
exceedingly hard to come by. The ICPSR election data that was used
has the month and year of most elections in our time period of
interest. Regardless, 29 election months had to be filled in using data
from the New York Times archives. With more time, an improved
election dataset could be generated that is date specific. The analysis
could then look at lynching the week or even the day of an election.
Related to this point is our definition of the election period. If
the dates for the nominating conventions were widely available, which
they are not, then the election period could be defined from the day of
the convention to the day of the election. We would also be able to
create election periods for the gubernatorial elections that do not occur
in November. As the "Within election period: Effect of close November
elections" table currently presents null results, improvements in the
data could draw out a relationship that we are currently missing.
The final addition to our dataset would be to generate margin of
victory regardless of the political parties participating. This would
retain some 2,000 election observations that are dropped due to third
parties participating in the election. While the concern of many in the
South was to prevent the Republicans from winning office, I believe
looking at elections that include Populists, Greenback, and other 3 rd
party movements could serve to illustrate this belief.
Conclusions:
We cannot conclude that violence in the South was premeditated
due to the very small (though significant) effect that close elections
have on violence within the election period.
Lopsided presidential elections are correlated with a decrease in
lynching per 100,000 blacks within the month of the election. Any
presidential election appears to decrease lynching the month of the
election, as noted through the state electoral timing analysis. Violence
decreases slightly election months, though we can only hypothesize
this result from an attempt to attribute legitimacy to the election
results and prevent federal election intervention.
In all regressions, the census variables have much larger effects
than the election variables, particularly the percent of the county
population that is black. Counties that have growing black populations
experience a remarkable decline in lynching, which is contrary to the
assertion in the historical literature that growing black populations
incite more violence (Ayers 1992, Horowitz 1983).
The month fixed effects analysis shows coefficients similar in size
to the election effects. In attempting to create an explanation beyond
the heat hypothesis for the influence of particular months, I found that
time periods with an impending election experience more violence than
non-election periods. However, this effect could potentially be
attributed to something else; as our more specific analysis found that
the average count of lynching did not increase in this period due to
election margins. Our causal model for this election period increase is,
as of yet, unspecified.
Violence in the American South could yet be politically motivated
when the aforementioned improvements are made upon the data. Our
analysis finds that close gubernatorial and presidential elections may
increase violence during an election period. The election period of
August through November experiences more violence than the same
period not during an election season. Lopsided presidential campagin
periods increase violence though violence drops the month of a
presidential election. It is possible that while election periods do have
a tendency for more violence, the close election margins the month of
the election decrease violence in an attempt to maintain legitimacy.
The effects are orthogonal but do not cancel out due to the methods
used to achieve their analysis.
Disenfranchisement in the American South was achieved through
a variety of means, though by looking at the "Redemption" period
alone, I've attempted to capture the period before disenfranchisement
was "de jure." The assumption, that "de facto" disenfranchisement
was achieved through intimidation and the threat of violence, appears
to be unverified. "De facto" disenfranchisement was a process where
factions of the Democratic Party introduced different elements that
made it more and more difficult to vote. Violence was not
premeditated by election periods, but correlated with decreases in the
months of close statewide elections. The legitimacy of the election
could not be questioned if the South wanted to avoid federal
intervention, though the federal government would most likely not be
interested unless it affected election outcomes. Lynching appears to
be most closely connected to the population of a region, and blacks
relocated to "safe" regions, which subsequently became safer. The
process of lynching intimidated the black population, but we cannot
make the case for lynching as an attempt to alter election outcomes.
Appendix:
Variable name
statecd
statecd
county
countyid
maxvote
secondvote
maxvote _d
secondvote r
year
office
month
voteshare
dems
reps
demshare
repshare
statevoteshare
close 55 *
lop_55_ *
close 60 *
lop_ 60_ *
lynch
black
blackpercapita
white
lynch_d
black d
whited
elect
MY
stardate
lynch_ *
black *
white *
lynch * d
black * d
white * d
Elections
Elections
Election_p
Electiong
Election c
totpop
Logblack
Percentblack
Percentblacksq
Definition
ICPSR state code
State abbreviation
County name
FITS county identification number
Largest vote share
Second largest vote share
Dummy if maxvote belongs to Democrats
Dummy if secondvote belongs to Republicans
Year of observation
Congress/President/Governor
Month of observation
(maxvote)/(maxvote+secondvote)
Democratic vote share (in state)
Republican vote share (in state)
Democratic vote share over Republicans (in state)
Republican vote share over Democrats (in state)
(maxvote)/(maxvote+secondvote) by state
Dummy if voteshare was b/t .45 and .55 (by office type)
Dummy if voteshare was >.55 (by office type)
Dummy if voteshare was b/t .40 and .60 (by office type)
Dummy if voteshare was >.60 (by office type)
Number of lynching
Number of black lynching
Black lynching per 10,000 people
Number of white lynching
Dummy for lynching
Dummy for black lynching
Dummy for white lynching
Election dummy
month_year string
Stata date code for month_year string
Lynching _ month(s) prior to observation
Black lynching _ month(s) prior to observation
White lynch _ month(s) prior to observation
Dummy for lynching _ month(s) prior to observation
Dummy for black lynching _ month(s) prior to observation
Dummy for white lynching _ month(s) prior to observation
Total elections that observation period (monthyear)
Dummy for election that observation period
Dummy for presidential election
Dummy for gubernatorial electon
Dummy for congressional election
Total population(county)
Log of the black population (county)
Black percent of the population (county)
Black percent of the population squared (county)
Percentblackcubed Black percent of the population cubed (county)
Variable name
SharecroplO
Totsharecrop
Urbanpop
Logpop
ID
Ccloseelect
Clopelect
Scloselect
Slopelect
Elect 3 d
Eperiod_d
Drrace
Minblack
Black3550
Blackl 035
CD
Distdemvote
Distrepvote
Disttotvote
Distvoteshare
Definition
Percent of sharecropping farms under 10 acres (county)
Percent of all farms that are sharecropping (county)
Percent of population that lives in urban areas (county)
Log of the total population (county)
String variable of county_state
County election where voteshare<=.60
County election where voteshare>=.60
State election where voteshare<=.60
State election where voteshare>=.60
Dummy for election from August-November
August-November
Dummy for Republican-Democrat race
Dummy if percentblack<=.35
Dummy if .35<=percentblack<=.50
Dummy if .10<=percentblack<=.35
Congressional district
Democratic vote share (in district)
Republican vote share (in district)
District vote total
(maxvote)/(maxvote+secondvote) by district
Campaign period
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Lynching per 100,000
Election from Aug-Nov 0.246*** 0.0963*
(0.0496) (0.0504)
Aug-Oct -0.00619
(0.0165)
Constant 0.0294*** 0.0325***
(0.00818) (0.00935)
Observations 686938 171450
R-squared 0.010 0.038
Standard errors in parentheses (From Aug-Oct)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
County and month fixed effects
At 45-55: Close elections, lopsided elections and lynching
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lynchings
per 100,000
VARIABLES blacks
"Limited sample"
Close Congressional election
(<55%)
Close Gubernatorial election
(<55%)
Close Presidential election
(<55%)
Lopsided Congressional election
(>55%)
Lopsided Gubernatorial election
(>55%)
Lopsided Presidential election
(>55%)
0
(0)
-0.249
(0.167)
-0.0435
(0.0909)
0.270
(0.290)
-0.109
(0.0708)
-0.0923
(0.0918)
Percent black
(Percent black)A2
(Percent black)^3
Log of population
Constant 0.0158
(0.0115)
686938
0.010
Observations
R-squared
0
(0)
-0.294
(0.192)
-0.0524
(0.0946)
0.318
(0.346)
-0.128
(0.0807)
-0.101
(0.0962)
-5.402**
(2.715)
12.81*
(7.169)
-9.022*
(5.317)
0.0206
(0.0252)
0.369***
(0.137)
551849
0.010
0
(0)
-0.291
(0.193)
0
(0)
-0.294
(0.192)
-0.0411 -0.0524
(0.0956) (0.0946)
0.321
(0.345)
0.318
(0.346)
-0.127 -0.128
(0.0811) (0.0807)
-0.0979 -0.101
(0.0953) (0.0962)
-5.402**
(2.715)
12.81*
(7.169)
-9.022*
(5.317)
0.0206
(0.0252)
0.0196 0.369***
(0.0144) (0.137)
551849 551849
0.010 0.010
Robust standard errors in
parentheses (state and year)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
County and month fixed effects
At 45-55: Within election period: Effect of close November elections
(1) (2)
COEFFICIENT Average lynching (Aug-Oct)
Close Congressional election (<55%) 0 0
0 0
Close Gubernatorial election (<55%) 0.00189 0.00228
(0.00124) (0.00166)
Close Presidential election (<55%) 0.00214 0.00294
(0.00209) (0.00265)
Percent black -0.0158
(0.03510)
(Percent black)A2 0.0556
(0.12500)
(Percent black)A3 -0.0546
(0.11300)
Log of population -0.000722
(0.00112)
Constant 0.00313*** 0.0117
(0.00051) (0.01060)
Observations 5950 5073
R-squared 0.193 0.203
Robust standard errors in parentheses (state and year)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
County and month fixed effects
a- -...- , ,:ii! , : ii: i ? 
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